The Double-Edged Sword of Power-Sharing in Autocracies

• In Event: Elites and State Capacity in Autocracies

Abstract

Scholars have pointed to the inherent tension of power-sharing in autocracies. Although it promises stability by giving elites a stake in the regime's long term survival, that promise comes at the expense of the autocrat who -- as a result of bestowing power onto the elite -- becomes more vulnerable to internal rivals. Given this inherent tension, how does power-sharing evolve over time? How do institutions that are meant to elicit the buy-in of elites change the internal dynamics of the regime? We take up this question in the context of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) who ruled Ethiopia for nearly 30 years. We argue that the EPRDF’s approach to ethnic party leadership selection was central in its project towards a unified political organization. By giving its constituent parties autonomy in choosing their own central committees at the regional level, the EPRDF secured buy-in into the coalition from local elites across the country. To corroborate this institutional account, we provide evidence from an original dataset of membership in the central committees of the EPRDF’s four constituent parties. Our analysis of over 600 individuals elected across 24 party congresses confirms significant over-time variation, suggesting that the four parties began as very different organizations with processes driven by distinct patterns of local competition. We also find that changes in central committee composition converged over time, signaling ERPDF’s once-junior parties acquired accumulated leadership experience that resembles that of its historically dominant member.

Authors

• Josef Woldense, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

• Leonardo R. Arriola, University of California, Berkeley

• Terrence Lyons, George Mason University

• Yosef Tadesse, UC Berkeley