Authoritarian Regime Origins and Coercive Power

• In Event: Elites and State Capacity in Autocracies

Abstract

How do the ways in which authoritarian elites come into power shape subsequent regime durability? We argue that the way in which the regime came into power shapes the fundamental relationship between regime leaders and coercive power. Since most autocracies are overthrown via violence, whether the leader and ruling coalition is vulnerable to the guardianship dilemma is a core concern. We present a typology of three distinct autocratic regime origins - rebel, coup, and civilian – and argue that each type has different consequences for stability. Rebel regime leaders can successfully share power with members of their own armed group, and therefore are the most stable regime type. Coup leaders often do not have the same type of trusted long-run experiences with their commanders, and therefore are frequently brought down by their own appointees. Civilian leaders are most fearful of the military – some can successfully sideline coercive actors, while others are extremely vulnerable to overthrow. We provide evidence of our theory using an original dataset of all global autocracies from 1900-2020.

Author

• Anne Meng, University of Virginia