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The presence and practices of the police vary substantially across place. Frequent and aggressive enforcement is often highly concentrated in poor, racially segregated neighborhoods, where officers are directed to preempt crime with tactics that generate large numbers of stops and arrests. How do these aggressive policies affect political behavior in the places they target? I exploit a policy that led to substantial within-neighborhood variation in the power and practices of the police, and show that residents reacted strongly to these changes. Beginning in the 1990s, a series of court-ordered injunctions against Los Angeles gangs established areas of the city where police powers were expanded, aggressive enforcement was encouraged, and the civil liberties of suspected gang members were severely curtailed. Drawing on a wide array of data sources, including aggregate and individual-level registration and turnout data, revealed preferences from ballot initiatives, and a panel survey, I find these harsh anti-gang crackdowns led to large increases in both electoral and non-electoral participation, particularly among Black, Latino, and young individuals. I find corresponding increases in support for criminal justice reform and self-reported discriminatory encounters with the police, consistent with claims that gang injunctions led to widespread racial profiling. Together, these findings suggest that concentrated anti-crime measures can have substantial electoral effects that extend far beyond those who are directly stopped and questioned by the police.