Self-Granting Immunity: When Do Politicians Grant Themselves Judicial Immunity?

• In Event: Poster Session: Judicial Politics & Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Judicial Politics

Abstract

The legal system of limiting judicial proceedings against lawmakers was originally intended to protect the people’s representatives from interference by the monarch. And, it remains in place even today, in various forms when most monarchies have disappeared. While immunity allows politicians to function independently of external forces, political incumbents often attempt to modify immunity provisions to avoid accountability for their own corruption or to undermine political opposition and subvert democratic practices. Despite its ubiquity and political importance, no systematic research has been conducted to explain why some countries offer broader immunity and others narrower or no immunity. In this study, I present a novel theory regarding the determinants of cross-national variation in judicial immunity for politicians. Building on the logic of political insurance, I formalize how political climates at the time of the constitutional overhaul structure interests of ruling elites on different types of immunity: intense political competition leads to broader immunity for legislators, but this relationship is contingent on a relatively lower level of judicial independence. To test my theoretical claims, I assemble original data on constitutional provisions of judicial immunity for politicians in countries that have been democratized since 1975. I find supporting evidence for my theoretical claims: intense political competition positively correlates with the parliamentary immunity index, conditional on low judicial independence. The findings provide an implication on the influence of law and courts in transitional justice and democratic consolidation.

Author

• Jonghoon Lee, Arkansas State University