Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Do international security contexts influence the frequency of U.S. presidential visits to their military allies? Previous scholars have shown that presidential visits have a deterrent effect on the country being visited. Given that the United States has 66 allies across distant continents, including Europe and the Asia-Pacific, do presidents prioritize visiting allies that are in the greatest need of extended deterrence from the United States? Or do they simply follow the predetermined diplomatic schedule? We argue that U.S. presidents strategically increase the frequency of their diplomatic visits to military allies in a region where the security environment becomes more hostile. Using a compositional analysis of ally visits made by U.S. presidents, we show that as conflicts involving their allies in a particular region escalate, presidents are more inclined to visit that region while decreasing their visits to other regions that are safer. We also find that the effect of security environments is greater when presidents face a divided government domestically. Our study presents the first empirical evidence that U.S. presidents adapt their travel diplomacy in reaction to international security environments and use their physical presence as a means of reassuring their allies when their hands are tied at home.