Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Why does states’ use of indiscriminate violence against civilians weaken insurgencies’ ability to operate in some civil wars while strengthening them in others? Many scholars conclude that state indiscriminate violence is counterproductive because it mobilizes civilians to support the insurgency. However, other empirical studies find indiscriminate violence weakened an insurgent opponent. I argue that the variation in the effectiveness of state indiscriminate violence depends on the logic of violence used and the level of insurgent territorial control in the targeted area. Indiscriminate violence following a punitive logic is rarely effective, particularly in contested areas. In contrast, state indiscriminate violence following an economic logic that seeks to break the economy of insurgent controlled areas effectively lowers insurgent strength. I test the theory with extensive archival interviews, documents, and quantitative data from insurgent controlled areas of South Vietnam during one of the most violent operations of the Vietnam War, Operation Speedy Express. The evidence demonstrates that the use of indiscriminate violence lowered the insurgency’s ability to operate and maintain population control due to the disruption of the economy in insurgent controlled areas. This article finds the troubling implication that states strategically use violence against their own economies to weaken insurgent opponents.