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Most online platforms characterize themselves as technology firms that enable transactions between independent workers and their clients. This characterization enables platforms to avoid responsibilities associated with employment such as social insurance, health and safety protection or paid holiday. This evasion has detrimental effects for platform workers, subverts fair competition with non-platform businesses, and deprives states of revenues with which to provide high quality public goods. As platforms become increasingly pervasive, we study the preferences of the different actors involved regarding the regulation of platform work and the categorization of platform workers as employees. We argue that the structure of welfare states matters for governments, while the role of labor costs in competition within business is what is important for firms. We support this framework with illustrative evidence from three different jurisdictions: Spain, California (US) and Denmark.