Varieties of Insecurity and Rebel-Civilian Ties across Time

• In Event: The Origins, Outcomes, and Legacies of Armed Rebellion

Abstract

Literature on rebel governance has examined various ways in which rebels engage with civilians, build informal governing institutions, and exert social control during civil war. When rebels win, how do organized ties with civilian supporters on the ground affect post-war politics? This paper explores how varieties of insecurity that the victor faces—from wartime rivals, from threats internal to their organizations, or from electoral insecurity—shape rebel-civilian ties' role in the consolidation of power. First, where victors face existential insecurity from wartime rivals, rebel-civilian ties complement other statebuilding strategies. Second, where victors face internal threats (i.e. coups), empowering military elites with strong ties to local populations is key for consolidating control. Finally, if the victor primarily faces electoral insecurity however, rebel-civilian ties may be repurposed as party brokers—a cheaper strategy for maintaining control than broader statebuilding. I examine forty years of rebel government rule in Zimbabwe, where the ruling party faced different threats at different points in time, to illustrate how rebel governance and rebel-civilian ties affect post-war politics differently based on ruling party constraints.

Author

• Shelley Liu, Duke University