Civil War Tycoons: Explaining Rebel Group Entrepreneurism in Myanmar

• In Event: Political Economy of Conflict

Abstract

Why do some rebel groups invest in large, capital-intensive businesses in the formal market whilst fighting the state during civil wars? While the literature has begun to zone in on the relationship between revenue sources held by rebel groups and their decisions, the curious case of rebel groups establishing capital-intensive formal businesses, such as large business groups or hydroelectric plants, is not well examined. To explain this puzzle, this paper argues that capital-intensive formal businesses owned by rebel groups are a key feature of symbiotic armed orders that arise from long-running civil wars. They are not established for financial gains but as a costly signal to credibly commit to a symbiotic armed order with the state in a hostile co-existence to fulfil a tactical necessity of the rebel group. I find support for this argument by comparing three rebel groups active in Myanmar – the KNU, the RCSS, and the KNPP – studied through 14 months of qualitative field research on the Thai-Myanmar border.

Author

• Jae Park, University of Toronto