Participation Incentives in International Counter-Nuclear Terrorism Institutions

• In Event: Poster Session: International Collaboration & Canadian Politics
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Collaboration

Abstract

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attacks are frequently described by policy-makers as among the gravest threats to public safety and security. International counter-nuclear terrorism institutions often receive extensive support and approval from a wide variety of states, many of which, such as Russia and the United States, have otherwise opposing visions of international cooperation and security. Previous scholarship has argued that the devastating potential costs of successful nuclear terrorism motivate states to allocate resources towards counter-nuclear terrorism efforts. However, this does not fully explain why coordination occurs across such a wide range of international actors, including states that experience little or no CBRN terrorism. In this paper, I examine the factors that motivate states to participate in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). I argue that international diplomatic and political factors, such as alliances and diplomatic affinity with great power states, influence the decision by states to participate in the GICNT alongside traditional security incentives, such as prior history of CBRN terrorism and radiological industries. I employ survival analysis to examine the decision-making process of 189 countries regarding GICNT participation between 2006 and 2017, finding support for both the security and political models. These findings should enable scholars and policy analysts to better understand counter- nuclear terrorism efforts, as well as the broader motivations for state actors to participate in international counter-terrorism institutions.

Author

• Jeremy Matthew Berkowitz, Prairie View A&M University