The Impact of Human Rights Sanctions on Public Opinion in Sender Countries

• In Event: Economic Instruments and Foreign Policy

Abstract

This paper explores how sanctions against human rights abusers affect the sanctioning government’s popularity. I argue that the use of human rights sanctions helps create a rally effect in sender countries. Prior research also suggests that voters care about economic performance; thus, it is expected that when people are primed with the economic costs of sanctions, they will be less inclined to support sanctioning leaders. Furthermore, I hypothesize that sanctioning rival countries is more likely to incite in-group/out-group sentiment than targeting friends. Using an experiment fielded in the US, I find that sanctioning human rights abusers will boost presidential popularity even if respondents know information about the potential economic costs of sanctions. Surprisingly, targeting ally rights abusers will generate stronger rally effects than targeting non-ally rights abusers. Results from mediation analyses further show that the increased approval for the sanctioning leader is driven by increased perceptions that (1) the leader is more competent, (2) the US is more prestigious in the world, and (3) the US has more influence in the world, compared to the scenario of doing nothing in response to human rights violations overseas.

Author

• Ryan Yu-Lin Liou, Wabash College