Electoral Costs of Supporting Democratic Norms: Depolarization vs Enthusiasm

• In Event: Elite Incentives to (Not) Adhere to Democratic Norms

Abstract

Past work has shown that politicians holding anti-democratic attitudes and employing anti-democratic tactics rarely leads to voters abandoning them at the ballot box. It often seems that voters, especially more ideological ones, would rather their side win in an anti-democratic way than lose democratically. Some scholars have emphasized the importance of politically moderate voters, who seem more willing to check elite misbehavior, as a solution to this problem. Drawing from the partisan cue taking literature, others argue that political elites need to model pro-democratic behavior in the hope partisans will follow. But are either of these strategies viable? Voters who are more ideologically moderate or less committed partisans may approve of politicians' pro-democratic acts, but those voters also tend to be less politically engaged and thus less likely to actually vote. In contrast, more ideological and partisan voters are more reliable but may view an in-party politician not using every tactic possible to win as a betrayal and in turn withhold their vote or at least reduce their level of support as a consequence. In experimental data I find that partisan elite cues (e.g., encourage/discourage) can shape support for support for anti-democratic tactics, but holding to democratic norms can decrease in-party members’ support if it means accepting a loss. I also explore how voters view cues from out-party elites and test if commitment to democratic norms actually can attract voters. The tension between depolarization and turnout aids our understanding of political elites’ incentives and how best to bolster democratic health.

Author

• William Cullen Kidd, University of California, Irvine