Negative Reputations, Spillover, and Cooperation

• In Event: International Reputation Reimagined: Cooperation, Complexity, and Contestation

Abstract

International relations research frequently argues that foreign policy decisions are shaped by concerns over reputation. Judgments on whether to use military force or violate international agreements are thought to be shaped, in part, by the anticipated reputation costs of these actions. Yet we know little about how reputation costs vary across actors and issue areas in world politics. To study the costs of a bad reputation, we develop a survey experiment that examines preferences for cooperation with countries that vary in reputation type. We gauge willingness to cooperate by measuring how generous the terms of an agreement need to be to induce support from respondents. This measure allows us to compare reputation costs across policy domains, and to assess whether bad reputations spill across issue areas and leaders. Our findings provide new insights into the strategic logic of reputation.

Authors

• Tyler Pratt, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

• Michael Goldfien, Naval War College

• Ryan M. Powers, University of Georgia

• Jonathan Renshon, University of Wisconsin, Madison