Shadow of Authoritarian Patronage: Village Leaders and Elections in South Korea

• In Event: Understanding Local Dynamics in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

This study explores whether the patronage between village leaders and an authoritarian government continues to influence voting outcomes in later elections under authoritarian and democratic settings. We claim that authoritarian patronage remains effective after democratization only when the clients can maintain strong trust in patronage. Using original data on village leader trainees under the New Village Movement, a nationwide campaign-style rural development program in the 1970s South Korea, we find that townships with more leaders trained by the authoritarian government were more likely to vote for the incumbent party in the subsequent legislative election. This tendency persisted in the following authoritarian elections in the 1980s under a new dictator. After South Korea transitioned to democracy in 1987, this effect initially waned but reemerged strongly as the authoritarian successor party rebranded through a strategic party merger. However, as democracy consolidated and the agricultural sector became marginalized with globalization, the effect of patronage eventually disappeared. Our findings highlight that the legacy of authoritarian patronage is shaped by political and economic conditions in a new democracy and disappears when the successor party’s reciprocity is no longer credible with democratic consolidation and economic globalization.

Authors

• Ji Yeon (Jean) Hong, University of Michigan

• Sunkyoung Park, Korea University

• Hyunjoo Yang