Explaining the Variations in the Outcomes of the “Arab Spring”

• In Event: Strategic Context and Implications of the Current Middle East Conflict

Abstract

The Arab Spring was a major endeavor to democratize the one area of the world which almost did not have any democracies by the start of the second decade of the 21st century—the Arab World. This endeavor, on the whole, did not succeed, though it did produce a great variation in outcomes. How could we best explain the key variations in the outcomes of the Arab Spring, especially with regard to the levels of violence and peace and also the level of democratization? I argue that the combined effect of two causal factors—state strength and national congruence-- is the most important for explaining the divergence in the outcomes. The two key factors are state strength—the effectiveness of the functioning of state institutions; and national congruence—the extent of congruence between geo-political boundaries and national aspirations and identities in the state. National incongruence might be internal—a multiplicity of ethno-national groups resides inside the state boundaries and they do not identify with the same national identity even though they are all fellow citizens. National incongruence can also be external. Such an external incongruence can be demographic, namely, quite a few members of the majority ethno-national group live outside the state boundaries in adjacent states. External incongruence can also be historically-based, which refers to territories in neighboring states that used to belong to the state in previous eras.

States, which are strong and nationally coherent, will tend to be good candidates for successful democratization and for the pacifying effects of liberalization. Tunisia is the best example of this pattern in the Arab Spring, even if far from a perfect example—indeed in recent years there has been democratic backsliding there. Still Tunisia is the only country which emerged with a functioning democracy at least for a decade after the outset of the Arab Spring on its territory.
States which are both weak and incongruent -- will tend to be failed states with civil wars and foreign intervention. There are quite a few cases which fit this pattern following the Spring: Yemen, Libya and Syria are the most obvious cases. Iraq is another case of a failed state, though, as a result of an external intervention--the 2003 US invasion and regime change. Strong states but externally incongruent will tend to produce a revisionist model and pose a potential threat to their neighbors. Shiite Iran is the major example, taking advantage of the Spring with the assistance of Shiite communities in various Arab states, notably Syria (the Alawite community, which is close to the Shia) and Yemen (another Shiite affiliate community--the Houthis who are members of the Zaidi Shiite sect). This in addition to using the trans-border Shiite connection in order to penetrate deep into the domestic politics of Iraq (following the American invasion) and Lebanon (based on very close ties to Hezbollah—the dominant military and political force in the country). Sunni Turkey might be another example of a revisionist state—with its invasion of Syria and its occupation of some territory in the north of the country—in a close alliance with some Sunni Syrians.
States, or even provinces inside sovereign states, which are nationally congruent even if they lack stateness, might produce a “frontier” state, with limited internal peace and even some level of democratization, but with on-going territorial conflicts with their neighbors. The best examples are the semi-autonomous Kurdish regions in northern Iraq and in north-eastern Syria.
Finally, the instability prevalent in failed states can be mitigated by the intervention of a great power, but in highly fragmented regions—such as the Middle East— such interventions might face a lot of problems and may have quite a bit of de-stabilizing effects. We will explore the conditions under which such interventions are stabilizing versus the conditions under which they are de-stabilizing. The key argument is that if the intervention produces a lower level of state capacity and continuous incongruence, it will generate greater instability than if the great power is able to raise the level of congruence, for example, by accomplishing formal or de-facto partitions. In this context we’ll contrast the de-stabilizing effects of the US interventions in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011—during the Arab Spring— in contrast to the relatively stabilizing effects of the US interventions in the Balkans during the 1990s.

Author

• Benjamin Miller, University of Haifa