Public Responses to Coercion: Evidence from the Sino-Australian Trade War

• In Event: Poster Session: International Political Economy 1 & Migration and Citizenship
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Political Economy 1

Abstract

Open Economy Politics (OEP) has become the dominant paradigm in IPE, defining the linkages between the increasingly globalized and interconnected economy and political outcomes at the domestic level. One of its core assumptions lies in the rationalist assumption that individuals, firms, or voters derive their interests from their positions in the international economy. Following this view, individuals possess the ability to accurately assess their economic positionality and translate it into corresponding interests. Expectedly, a large body of literature attempting to test whether this assumption holds has emerged since the turn of the century, with a large number of studies focusing on international trade. Despite the breadth of this literature in terms of focus and methodology, no consensus has been attained on the rationalist assumptions behind OEP. Whether material interests or factors further removed from economic reality play the greatest part in shaping voter attitudes and preferences remains a question of ongoing debate in IPE.

Even though economic statecraft represents an increasingly salient phenomenon, the above debate has not yet truly permeated the literature on sanctions and economic coercion. Given the growing body of literature arguing that public opinion represents a credible constraint on states’ foreign policy, understanding how targeted countries’ populations react to economic coercion is key to evaluating the effectiveness of the weaponization of global economic linkages. Specifically, sanctions and economic coercion are considered ineffective by most when they create widespread backlash among the populations of targeted states. However, much of the literature on economic statecraft focuses primarily on the states engaging in coercive activities, with relatively little attention being given to the public’s response in affected ones. Expanding the field’s understanding of the political responses of victims of economic coercion is especially key given the current-day context of intensifying competition between the United States and China. Indeed, the magnitude of China’s economic linkages with many states around the world along with its frequent weaponization of them create a significant economic impact on many populations around the world. If individuals form their political opinions as a result of such material impact, key implications will arise both regarding the effectiveness of economic statecraft in the present-day context and for IPE’s evaluation of the assumptions behind OEP.

This article seeks to provide new evidence furthering such an understanding through an analysis of public opinion during the trade war having opposed Australia to China since the end of the 2010s. Following tensions surrounding Australian foreign policy stances espoused under the Morisson government, China implemented several protectionist measures targeted against the former. The main tariffs and embargoes imposed by China during the conflict were aimed at export industries for which China had previously represented a major market, including barley, wine, coal, and timber. It is undeniable that it has represented a significant shock for Australia, whether in terms of political impact or economic effects. Whether the Australian public articulate their attitudes toward China in light of their varying degrees of exposure to its recent uses of economic coercion hence represents one of the most recent cases with the potential to test the rationalist assumptions behind OEP and their applicability to economic statecraft.

The proposed study will combine correlational analyses with a survey experiment. For the former, trade exposure scores will be calculated and aggregated by economic area based on local industry shares and national sectoral trade exposure statistics. A logistic regression strategy will then be used to test whether residents in regions generally more exposed to trade flows with China have their attitudes toward the latter affected differently by the recent trade tensions than the overall public. Industry-specific effects will then also be investigated, with separate analyses testing whether individuals living in areas of concentrated barley and coal production, two industries specifically targeted by China’s economic statecraft in recent years, react differently than the overall Australian population in forming their views of China following the start of trade tensions. In the survey experiment, individuals belonging to the control group will be given general information regarding the trade conflict, while those in the treatment group will be primed with additional information regarding its economic fallout on everyday Australians. If economic self-interest plays a significant role in shaping the public’s attitudes relating to economic coercion, significant treatment effects will exist and render individuals more likely to perceive China as a threat.

Author

• Benjamin Toettoe