The Iron Dice: Fatalism in International Relations

• In Event: Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Abstract

Leaders in international relations often exhibit fatalism, or the belief that events are guided by structural forces beyond their control, such as a rival’s machinations, wider structural dynamics, or destiny. As the German statesman Otto von Bismarck put it, “the God who directs the battle will cast his iron dice.”

In some cases, these beliefs may simply reflect reality, or be mere rhetoric to boost support, but there is also an important psychological explanation. Fatalism can help leaders avoid responsibility for costly outcomes and protect their self-image. Fatalism is more likely: (1) in regard to bad outcomes versus good outcomes; (2) when war is seen as imminent versus more distant in time; and (3) in non-democratic regimes versus democratic regimes. Dictators who stare down a disaster of their own making are especially prone to extreme fatalism.

The argument is important for several reasons. First, fatalism may be more common among leaders in international relations versus other domains. Causality and responsibility for decisions are especially hard to discern in global politics due to the array of complex forces at work and the diverse range of state and non-state actors. In addition, outcomes in IR may incur a dramatic cost in blood and treasure, and leaders are incentivized to reduce the psychic burden of governance by highlighting the structural drivers for bad events.

Second, fatalism among leaders is surprising because it seems to contradict the well-established psychological tendency toward overconfidence and the “illusion of control,” where people exaggerate their capacity to manipulate events even if they are inherently uncontrollable. This tension can be resolved because leaders exhibit an illusion of control with good things (i.e., claiming credit for positive outcomes), and display fatalism with bad things (i.e., seeking to diminish responsibility for costly decisions by appealing to wider forces).

Third, extreme forms of fatalism can be dangerous for leaders and may even be a cause of war. The feeling of causal agency is vital for an individual’s mental health and fatalism can spur depression, passivity, and “learned helplessness,” which is especially perilous in a crisis when war and peace hang in the balance.

Fourth, the argument offers implications for democratic peace theory. If elected leaders are less prone to extreme fatalism, democracies may have more room to maneuver in a crisis, helping to explain the lack of war between these regimes. Whereas traditional democratic peace theory highlights the pacifying effect of norms like the peaceful resolution of disputes, this argument focuses on beliefs about individual agency.

The concept of fatalism is central to philosophy, religion, medicine, and sociology. Fatalism is a core idea in psychology, where the link between a perceived lack of control and mental distress is “one of the best-established, most often reproduced findings in all of social psychology.” Many historians have highlighted the importance of fatalistic beliefs in causing individual wars. Given all this, it is quite striking that not a single book, chapter, or article exists on fatalism among leaders in IR. Scholars have long explored whether individual leaders actually have agency, but they have given much little attention to leaders’ beliefs about whether or not they have agency.

This paper introduces the concept of fatalism to decision-making in IR, explores the causes and effects of fatalism, and tests the argument with case studies of the origins of World War I and World War II.

Author

• Dominic Tierney, Swarthmore College