Empire and Petition: Consultation and Control in Extended Autocracies

• In Event: Historical Political Economy

Abstract

Medieval and early-modern empires frequently exhibited a "petition-response system" between distant subjects and the metropolitan crown. We explore the strategic logics of this system. Petitions suggest a "centripetal" flow of information to the crown that bypasses local officials, which we argue helps to check their power. Equally important is the other side of the system: the norm of response by the crown even to relatively mundane petitions from near-powerless subjects. We argue that this norm catalyzes a "centrifugal" information flow. First, it signals to petitioners that the crown hears their concerns, so that in turn future petitioners will express them. Second, the norm of response reifies the crown's sovereignty by distributing information that the monarch is the one to whom subjects turn for favor. Each side of the petition-response system thus addresses the essential challenge of imperial governance: projecting sovereignty---over imperial officials on one hand, and subjects on the other. In turn, this challenge is the foundation of an inclusive and consultative practice of governance even in autocratic systems. We illustrate these strategic logics with qualitative evidence from several imperial regimes – Carolingian and Capetian royal empires (9th-12th centuries), the Spanish empire (16th century) and the British empire (17th-19th centuries). Our equilibria and interpretation point to the imperial roots of one of the world’s inclusive institutions and generate a range of new testable hypotheses.

Authors

• Daniel P. Carpenter, Harvard University

• Sean Gailmard, University of California, Berkeley