Legislators in Networks: Corruption, Clientelism, and Law-Making

• In Event: Poster Session: Legislative Studies & American Political Economy
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Legislative Studies

Abstract

How do legislative networks affect politics? This project examines the effect of lawmakers' ties in the Ukrainian parliament on corruption, political survival, and law-making activities. In addition to conventional party and fraction ties, Ukrainian legislators tend to form networks through unelected parliamentary staff where personal legislative assistants serve as human links between members of parliament. Dr. Vlasenko suggests that a higher number of legislator's ties within such networks is associated with increased returns to office through participation in corruption schemes, better chances of reelection, and higher frequency of legislative co-sponsorship. This effect of legislative networks exists due to proliferation of clientelist relations aided by Ukrainian oligarchs. The study implies that rent-seeking and vote-buying behavior is made possible by low levels of accountability and transparency which are typical for countries with weak democratic institutions.

Author

• Anastasiia Vlasenko, Columbia University