The Logic of Political Entry during Violent Elections: Evidence from Mexico

• In Event: Comparative Electoral Institutions

Abstract

Elections tend to be violent events in many democratic settings, but in Latin America they lead to the systematic targeting of politicians by organized crime groups. It is thus unclear why individuals decide to run as mayoral candidates at the local level during violent elections. To answer this, we develop a formal model that explains why individuals decide to enter politics within the context of drug wars. We find that a candidate's decision to run while facing the risk of assassination is a function of both their political ideology and the probability that they are killed inadvertently in drug violence. Candidates seeking more radical changes are more likely to run even under the threat of violence. However, we also maintain that the range of candidates willing to run increases as indiscriminate drug violence worsens since not running may also impose a political cost. Our model sheds light on some of the mechanisms through which criminal organizations can undermine democracy at the local level in the Global South.

Authors

• Juan Campos, University of California, Berkeley

• Navin A. Bapat, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill