Observing Allies: The Advantage of Limited Information

• In Event: Formal Models of Conflict

Abstract

Uncertainty about a strategic partner is as common as uncertainty about a rival. This article argues that a state's knowledge of its friend affects the aggression of its rival. I develop a formal model in which a Target and its Ally form a military coalition against a Challenger. Challenger and Target are uncertain about Ally's willingness to support Target in the event of war, and Target can choose its ability to obtain this information. The results show that a stronger intelligence capability of Target can make Challenger more or less aggressive, depending on their prior beliefs about Ally's willingness to support Target. If Target is confident about Ally's support, it will invest more in gathering information about Ally. If Target is pessimistic, it will benefit from investing less and letting Challenger know that it has limited information. This article advances our understanding of the interplay between information, deterrence, and war.

Author

• Yu Mei, University of Rochester