The Silent Game of Many: To Collude or to Shirk?

• In Event: Climate Crises, Violence and Governance

Abstract

The well-known link between weak oversight and bureaucratic malfeasance, notably shirking and collusion, conceals a paradox: if poor oversight encourages shirking, why then do agents exert effort to collude under the exact condition of lax oversight? Redirecting the focus from external oversight, I examine the role of peer reputation in explaining different forms of malfeasance. I argue that fragmented executive authority has a dual effect: it discourages shirking by raising the reputational stake among peers, yet it also fosters collusion by diluting accountability among those involved. To evaluate this argument, I investigate the expansion of China's automatic ambient air quality network --- an initiative aimed at reinforcing bureaucratic control and improving the quality of environmental data. I built an original dataset consisting of mission statements from all prefecture-level government agencies in China. Using measurements based on text analysis, I find that prefectures with more fragmented environmental responsibilities tend to adhere more closely to regulations for setting up monitoring stations, indicating reduced shirking. Conversely, these same prefectures tend to strategically place stations in cleaner sites post-automation, implying potential collusion. This research sheds light on how intra-locale and inter-agency interactions can skew policy outcomes. It also underscores the limitation of relying solely on technological solutions to tackle the principal-agent problem. Simply replacing human agents with an automated system is insufficient. The efficacy of these technological tools ultimately depends on the organizational dynamics among the agencies tasked with implementing these automation policies on the ground.

Author

• Guoer Liu, University of California, San Diego