Why Did Montesquieu Write “The Spirit of the Laws?”

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Abstract

In one of his first published essays, “Needs and Justice in The Wealth of Nations,” Istvan Hont showed that Adam Smith had to be understood in relation to seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence. In this paper, I argue that the same is true of Montesquieu. Drawing on Montesquieu’s notes, his earlier unfinished project for a Treatise on Duties, and a close reading of the preface and first book of The Spirit of the Laws, I argue that Montesquieu conceived of his magnum opus as a treatise on statecraft and legislation which would complement the theories of political right and obligation than had been constructed in the previous century by Grotius and Pufendorf.

One implication of my argument is that, against a common view, it suggests Montesquieu was opposed neither to natural law nor to the idea of an original compact, so long as any original compact was understood in an anti-Hobbesian manner, and as a hypothetical construction to make sense of the reciprocal moral obligations between a people and a government rather than as real history. Another implication regards the thought of Rousseau. At the end of Emile, Rousseau offered an interpretation of what Montesquieu was doing not dissimilar to mine, followed by a criticism of Montesquieu’s project. Rousseau contended that a true science of politics would have to go a step beyond The Spirit of the Laws. It would have to be a unified science encompassing statecraft, legislation, and the fundamental principles of political right and obligation. Moreover, it would have to displace rather than complement the tradition of Grotius. Rousseau’s political thought was an attempt to overcome what he believed to be the limits of Montesquieu.

Author

• William Selinger, University of Oklahoma