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Examining the Logic behind the Timing Decision in North Korea's Missile Tests

Sat, September 7, 2:00 to 3:30pm, Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Franklin 2

Abstract

I. Introduction:
For long, the North Korean nuclear crisis has been a headache for the international community. Although North Korea has conducted only 6 nuclear tests to date, since initiating ballistic missile research in 1976, the country has carried out over 200 missile test launches, including short-, medium-, intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles (CSIS Missile Defence Project, 2023). Ballistic missiles possess the capacity to transport nuclear warheads, featuring notable attributes such as high speed, extensive range, and resilience against interception by anti-aircraft systems (Mettler & Reiter, 2013). Consequently, the significance of ballistic missile tests for the North Korean nuclear plan is self-evident. Especially in recent years, the frequent ballistic missile tests by the North Korean authorities have garnered widespread attention from the global community. Upon assuming leadership, Kim Jong Un initiated a systematic campaign to enhance and advance North Korea's ballistic missile program. From 2012 to 2023, North Korea has carried out over 214 missile tests and debuted a range of missiles with progressively extended capabilities (Missile Defence Project, 2023). The year 2022 saw more missile tests from North Korea than at any time in its history. In 2022 alone, North Korea conducted 34 missile test launches (Missile Defence Project, 2023). As of the current date in 2023, a review of online news reports reveals that North Korea has already conducted 37 test launches this year.However, despite some views that attribute the frequent missile tests to Kim Jong-un's purportedly unpredictable personality (e.g., Trump call him “ Little Rocket Man ”) (Choe, 2017), it is noteworthy that under Kim Jong-un's leadership, the frequency of missile tests in North Korea has not remained consistently high. For instance, based on the CSIS Missile Defence Project (2023), in 2019, North Korea conducted only 10 missile tests, and even in 2020, there was only one test conducted.

II. Research Questions:
This raises a series of confusing research questions: why is it that North Korea at times engages in frequent missile tests while at other times remains relatively quiet, conducting only a few tests? How does North Korea determine the timing of its missile tests? What factors influence North Korea's choice of when to conduct missile launches? As a nation driven by the pursuit of maximizing its own interests, North Korea's decision to test missiles is unlikely to be arbitrary and erratic but has its own logic. Most scholars have approached the study of the North Korean nuclear crisis from the perspective of how to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization, while very few scholars delve into the timing of North Korea's ballistic missile tests.
The investigation of this issue not only is of great significance in academic terms but also carries crucial policy implications. Clarifying the underlying logic behind North Korea's selection of missile test timing can assist the United States and its allies in enhancing strategic preparedness and foresight. Consequently, this understanding can inform the adoption of proactive and effective measures to mitigate North Korea's inclination to conduct missile tests.

III. Theory Framework:
In this research, using a multi-player sequential game model, we conduct a systematic investigation into the timing of North Korea's missile test launches. we argue that the timing selection represents a strategic decision undertaken by North Korea following careful deliberation among the strategic choices of key stakeholders in Northeast Asia. Put differently, aiming to serve its best interests, the timing of North Korea's missile tests is decided upon strategic interactions involving the five primary stakeholders in the region: China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. In the following, first, we conduct dyadic analyses involving each pertinent country and North Korea, in accordance with the hierarchy of influence on North Korea’s issue. Due to Japan's alignment with the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue and the absence of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea to date, there has been a prolonged lack of contact and dialogue. Moreover, unlike South Korea, Japan does not share a direct border with North Korea and does not readily stimulate North Korea's nerves because of legitimacy issues. Therefore, a separate analysis of Japan's relationship with North Korea is not warranted. Next, a nuanced exploration of the complex dynamics involving multiplayer strategic interactions will ensue.

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