Explaining Putin’s Public Approval with Priming and Terror Management Theories

• In Event: Putin's Russia and Autocratization

Abstract

Manipulative rhetoric has long proven to be an effective tool for political leaders seeking to influence social behavior. In these contexts, research suggests that autocratic leaders commonly leverage political priming to consolidate or maintain power. Yet, the nuances of contemporary authoritarian priming strategies remain understudied. Using the Russian case under Vladimir Putin’s presidency, I show how both priming and terror management theories explain Putin’s high approval rating under circumstances where research would otherwise expect approval to wane. Specifically, I employ text-as-data methods to identify Putin’s priming emphasis on an existential crisis emanating from an external threat. I furthermore argue and find that this priming rhetoric includes elements of information manipulation pertaining to external threats, thus helping Putin instill existential fear among citizens. This, in turn, stimulates narratives of national unification and deflects people’s attention away from Russia’s economic decline. In leveraging my text-as-data measures within a series of secondary statistical analyses, I then determine that (i) a threat narrative allows Putin to maintain a high approval rating despite the deteriorating economy, and (ii) the activation of military-related actions serves to reinforce Putin’s approval. I conclude by discussing the general implications of my findings for the literature on autocracies and their significance for Russia’s war in Ukraine in particular.

Author

• Daria Blinova, University of Delaware