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In the post-Cold War era, Russia has maintained a neutral stance on China’s maritime disputes with Vietnam and land border dispute with India. Nevertheless, Russia has indirectly involved itself in these disputes. For example, Russia’s oil companies have collaborated with Vietnam in exploring hydrocarbons in the South China Sea. Russia has served as a key supplier of defense equipment and technology to India and Vietnam. This paper explains why in spite of its suspicions and displeasure, Beijing has for most of the time refrained from using its growing leverage to push Russia to boost support for China in these disputes. I argues that 1) China is less likely to see a shift in Russia’s position as necessary or crucial if Beijing is confident in its military and paramilitary capabilities vis-à-vis India and Vietnam; 2) China is less likely to see a shift in Russia’s position as an unequivocal gain if preventing the formation of U.S.-led encirclement/containment in the Indo-Pacific remains Beijing’s highest priority; 3) if Being sees a risk of provoking a Russian backlash, it tends to be more cautious and selective when nudging Russia toward a position more aligned with China’s interests.