Fighting for Survival: When Do Leaders Repatriate Refugees by Force?

• In Event: Refugees, Violence, and Integration

Abstract

This paper delves into the intricate dynamics of refugee repatriation, particularly focusing on when and why states might choose to enforce the return of refugees. Recognizing that not all states consistently enforce such practices, this research aims to explain the variation in states' approach to forced repatriation. Drawing on previous studies on refugee policy-making, this study postulates that national leaders, chiefly motivated by their desire to remain in office, will weigh the domestic and international costs and benefits of forced repatriation. Politically insecure leaders might see advantages in repatriating refugees to gain domestic support, especially in situations where anti-refugee sentiment is heightened, such as during electoral periods. Conversely, the international reputational and financial risks associated with breaching international refugee law might deter leaders from enforcing repatriation, particularly in states heavily reliant on foreign aid. The identity of refugees, in terms of their ethnic ties with host country's political factions, can further complicate this decision-making. Additionally, interstate rivalries play a role: hosting refugees from rival states can be strategically advantageous, while those from allied nations might be forcibly repatriated to appease both domestic audiences and international allies. This paper thus offers a multifaceted understanding of the determinants of forced repatriation policies, blending domestic politics with international relations.

Author

• Perisa Davutoglu, University of Pittsburgh