Mini-Conference on Democracy and Organized Crime

This mini-conference explores the reciprocal relationship between democracy and organized crime across the globe. Criminal groups significantly influence democratic processes, impacting elections, policies, and voter preferences. Simultaneously, the activities of criminal groups depend on state actors, influenced by security policies and governance decisions. Despite its global prevalence, the impact of organized crime on democracy remains poorly understood. This mini-conference delves into this complex relationship, examining the roles of elected officials, voters, security policies, and governance dynamics.

Our first panel, “Democracy, Political (In)stability, and Organized Crime,” examines how criminal groups influence democratic politics and the consequences of doing so. While democracy can hold officials accountable, it can also be exploited by criminal groups to influence who enters office and what policies are put in place. Further, democratic transitions of power can also be destabilizing to the ties between local officials and criminal groups. This panel examines the dynamics between democracy and organized crime, from the introduction of electoral changes and post-democratic reforms to shifts in state capacity and leadership. The papers here examine the effects on violence, criminal activities, state stability and capacity, and policy choices. This panel encompasses theoretically and empirically rigorous works, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, original data, interviews, and extensive documentation, in studies from across the globe, including Mexico, Kenya, Ecuador, and Brazil. Together, these papers draw a unique understanding of the complex relationship between democracy and organized crime.

Our second panel, “How Organized Crime Affects Citizens' Political Behavior?”, is dedicated to understanding the role of voters and accountability in democracies with organized crime. Using experimental and survey evidence in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico, as well as in a low-violence context like the Peruvian case, this panel offers relevant insights on civilians’ attitudes that shape how representation and accountability are held in organized crime-affected areas. On the one hand, it addresses citizens’ attitudes toward victims in the context of war, considering gender and non-gender-based violence, as well as attitudes toward unauthorized migrant populations who leave their countries amid criminal violence. On the other hand, this panel also addresses perceptions toward state actors and the regime type, examining popular perceptions toward threatened politicians (by criminal groups), the military in contexts affected by organized crime, and how the perceived presence of drug trafficking organizations shapes voter support for elections and democracy.

Our third panel, “Public Security in Conflict & Post-conflict Settings,” explores the politics of law enforcement by examining the interactions between criminal groups, police forces, and elected candidates. In conflict and post-conflict settings, political incentives of criminal actors and politicians often condition security assistance. This panel explores the politics of law and order in Latin America, placing particular emphasis on Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Within these states, the persistent issue of police violence and the lack of police reform have significantly shaped public sentiments toward law enforcement. The papers presented in this panel draw upon original datasets derived from survey and survey experiments, administrative data, and extensive qualitative information. Together, these papers shed light on the complex interplay involving elected officials, police officers, criminals, and citizens within societies marked by racial tensions and eroded democratic structures, especially in the context of widespread police violence.

Our final panel, “Crime-State Symbiosis: New Theories and Evidence,” challenges the very notion of who can be a governing – and perhaps even democratic – body. Similar to states, criminal groups provide justice, services, and defense to civilians. Unlike rebel groups, criminal governance does not always seek to overthrow or replace the state, instead working inside of it. Yet, we understand little about why groups govern in different ways, how they decide on and enforce rules, and their broader relationships with state governance. This panel seeks to expand our theoretical understanding of criminal governance using clear conceptual frameworks and formal models, as well as presenting original qualitative evidence from Brazil and survey experiments in Mexico and Colombia. These projects provide a comprehensive view of what criminal governance is and provide theories to understand how it works in relation to state governance.

In accordance with our agreement with the Conflict Processes and Comparative Politics of Developing Countries divisions, each has agreed to sponsor two panels.